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ON MAY 20, 2003, the discovery of a single cow infected with 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) — mad cow disease — 
from Marwyn Peaster's farm in Peace River, Alberta, heralded an 
economic catastrophe for Canadian cattle producers. Over thirty-
three countries closed their borders to Canadian beef exports. 
The potential negative impact of a $2.5-billion loss in cattle 
exports will translate into a $2-billion loss in GDP, a $5.7-billion 
decline in total output and 75,000 jobs lost.1 BSE made the front 
page not because efforts to prevent the entry and transmission 
of BSE had been too little, too late, and not because of the poten-
tial human health risks — but largely because of the enormous 
disruption caused to Canada's cattle markets and regional 
economies. In fact, BSE was not diagnosed until over three 
months after the cow had been condemned as unfit for human 
consumption and slaughtered. Meanwhile, the carcass had 
already been rendered into livestock feed. 
Consumers have been questioning food safety for over a 
century. From Upton Sinclair's The Jungle in 1906 — an expose 
of unsanitary food handling in Chicago's meat packing plants — 
to Eric Schlosser's Fast Food Nation in 2001, the livestock and 
meat-packing industries have lent themselves to alarming 
accounts. A century ago, the prevalence of bovine tuberculosis 
spurred the establishment of government-sanctioned meat 
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inspection, while today meat is associated with a new set of dis-
eases. The fact is, after all the science, all the guidelines and all 
the exposes, we still do not understand all of the risk factors 
or how to respond to them. As we'll see later, the risks posed by 
BSE were mismanaged in the U.K. and Canada's own BSE policies 
are questionable. 
Which explains why, despite all the headlines about BSE or 
E. coli 0157:H7, the greatest contemporary challenge faced by 
the cattle and beef industry, its regulators and public policy 
makers, is risk management. Consumers rely on their govern-
ment to oversee farm-to-fork quality assurance programs. These 
programs span a long commodity chain that is often hidden 
behind closed doors and divided between federal and provincial 
jurisdictions. If we as consumers are to understand the risks to 
beef safety, and, most importantly, understand what ingenuity can 
be brought to the process to manage these risks, we need to 
understand the industry itself. 
THE CATTLE-BEEF COMMODITY CHAIN 
As with all other food, the production of beef is vertically organ-
ized into a sequence of activities — the commodity chain — 
which adds value to basic organic ingredients: grass and cows. 
The first link in the chain, calf production, is found on specialist 
farms known as cow-calf operations, and also takes place among 
other activities on mixed farms. As the gestational foundation of 
the commodity chain, beef cows are found in every Canadian 
province. In 2001, 80.7 percent of beef cows originated in Prairie 
Canada — 43.7 percent from Alberta alone.2 Dairy cows are con-
centrated mainly in Quebec and Ontario, and their bull calves are 
also raised for slaughter. 
Within months of birth, calves are dehorned to prevent 
injury, vaccinated to prevent common bovine diseases, and bull 
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calves are castrated to prevent the development of masculine 
characteristics. Growth hormones are commonly administered to 
beef calves, usually as an implant in the outer ear, a body part that 
never enters the human food chain. Growth hormones help cattle 
to reach market weight sooner and reduce feed costs by 
increasing feed efficiency. In North America, it is believed that 
the concentration of hormones in the beef of treated cattle is 
WITHIN MONTHS OF BIRTH, CALVES ARE DEHORNED 
TO PREVENT INJURY, VACCINATED TO PREVENT 
COMMON BOVINE DISEASES, AND BULL CALVES ARE 
CASTRATED TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF MASCULINE CHARACTERISTICS. 
minute relative to the natural background level of hormones in 
the human body, and that they pose no health risk to consumers. 
Nevertheless, the European Union has banned the import of beef 
produced using growth hormones, effectively shutting Canada 
out of European beef markets. 
Backgrounding, the second phase in cattle production, 
starts with weaned calves. Standing grass in summer and sun-
cured hay in winter provides the nutrients required for them to 
grow out and build the skeletal frame of mature animals. It is the 
most land-intensive production phase of the commodity chain, 
and producers must manage grassland carefully to prevent over-
grazing and secure sufficient winter-feed. 
Grain feeding, the third phase, finishes animals to 
slaughter weight — about 1,200 pounds (540 kilograms) for 
heifers and 1,300 pounds (590 kilograms) for steers. In Ontario 
and eastern Canada, this is often a small-scale winter enterprise 
on mixed farms. In Alberta, cattle finishing takes place on special-
ized feedlots containing 10,000 to 20,000 head, though some are 
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much larger. New arrivals receive a hay ration that is gradually 
stepped up to about 80 percent grain. In Ontario, the principal 
grain is corn while Alberta's cooler climate and shorter growing 
season make barley the feed of choice. Alberta dominates the 
industry; on January 1, 2003, it accounted for 63.5 percent of 
Canada's total beef cattle on specialized feeding operations.^ 
Finished cattle are shipped to the packinghouse by live-
stock trucking firms in cattle-liners, large aluminum semi-trailer 
trucks. Most cattle are sold direct to the packer. Pricing systems 
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are complex and may be based either on liveweight or carcass 
weight. Prices are often negotiated as forward delivery contracts 
for truckload lots, months in advance of delivery. 
Slaughter plants receive cattle on a just-in-time basis, 
seldom holding live animals for more than a few hours, pro-
viding time for ante-mortem inspection by a veterinarian. 
Alberta kill plants tend to specialize in the highest-quality grain-
fed steers and heifers. In Quebec, the largest packing plants 
process spent cows culled from the dairy herd, which are used 
for ground beef and processed meat products. In older and 
smaller plants, cattle are stunned unconscious one at a time in a 
traditional "knocking box." But in most large-scale facilities, 
there is a continuous-flow style of humane slaughter. Cattle walk 
calmly into the plant, gradually straddling a conveyor that lifts 
them gently off the floor. They glide calmly along the moving rail, 
oblivious to the impending blow from a pneumatically powered 
stunner that will cause sudden and immediate unconsciousness.4 
The insensible animal is shackled and slowly rises to the bleeding 
rail for exsanguination. The feet are cut off with powerful 
hydraulic shears and the carcass is suspended from a gambrel that 
slides along an overhead rail for removal of the hide and head. 
The abdominal cavity is opened to remove the viscera, and the 
carcass is then split into two sides. Conveyor tables carry pans of 
viscera in synch with the carcass until meat inspectors have 
examined the critical organs and lymph nodes and are satisfied 
there is no evidence of disease. Suspect and randomly selected 
carcasses are subject to in-plant swab tests and laboratory 
analysis of various tissues to identify antibiotic or hormonal 
residues and a variety of other contaminants. After final trim-
ming to remove any visible contamination, bruises or lesions, the 
carcass is transferred to the cooler where Canadian Beef Grading 
Agency staff assign a carcass quality grade depending on age, 
meat texture, and marbling. Once again, Alberta dominates, 
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accounting for 68.5 percent of Canada's reported cattle slaughter 
in 2002. 
Large-scale beef dressing lines in state-of-the-art plants are 
designed to avoid the potential for cross-contamination, which 
has been recognized as a food safety hazard since the nineteenth 
century.^ The "hide-off area" of the kill floor is segregated from 
the "hide-on area," which is prone to manure splash from dirty 
hooves and hides. All cutting tools must be immersed in scalding 
water between each animal on the line. At some workstations, 
direct contact with blood or viscera is unavoidable. For these 
workers, there are long rubber aprons and high boots. Between 
each animal on the line, the worker steps into a clear plastic 
shower booth equipped with water jets to remove all trace of the 
previous carcass before the next in line is handled. The largest 
beef dressing plants are also equipped with massive steam pas-
teurization chambers that use scalding steam to kill any 
pathogens inadvertently transferred to the surface of the carcass 
during processing. 
Fabrication or carcass-breaking divides the side of beef into 
smaller primal cuts (hip, sirloin, short loin, rib and chuck), each of. 
which is subsequently carved into subprimal cuts. The various cuts 
are sorted into standard lots, vacuum-sealed in plastic film and 
packed in cartons, labelled to indicate the name of the cut and the 
source of the beef. Boxed beef is shipped in refrigerated semi-
trailer trucks as soon as possible to minimize the time that it must 
be held in the plant's cold storage warehouse. Much of the output 
is destined for the distribution centres of supermarket and fast 
food chains while the reminder is sent to manufacturers for further 
processing into specialty meat products and individual portion-
controlled servings for institutional and commercial kitchens. 
As one might expect of an intensely competitive and entre-
preneurial industry, the basic commodity chain has many variants. 
The tendency to specialize in just one link of the chain is offset bv 
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the propensity to integrate forwards or backwards, and take some 
degree of control and profit over adjacent activities. Some parts 
of the chain have become fully integrated and co-located. For 
example, cow-calf producers may also background their weaned 
calves while Lakeside Packers of Brooks, Alberta, operates a 
feedlot across the highway from its kill plant, providing an in-
house source for slaughter cattle. 
Like many other resource processing industries, meat 
packing restructured dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. Meat 
packing shifted westward to follow cattle production, which has 
become strongly concentrated in Alberta. Canada Packers and 
Swift Canadian, the packinghouse leaders of the mid-twentieth 
century, gradually withdrew from the production of fresh com-
modity beef as a new beef processing duopoly emerged: 
• Cargill Foods of High River, Alberta, a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Minnesota-based Cargill, a global food processor 
and grain trader. 
• Lakeside Packers of Brooks, Alberta, a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of South Dakota-based Tyson Fresh Meats, the world's 
largest beef and pork supplier. 
These two plants account for 80 percent of Canada's capacity for 
slaughtering heifers and steers.6 While the industry leaders have 
changed, the meat-packing sector retains its high level of market 
concentration. 
As trends in domestic beef consumption became uncoupled 
from domestic cattle slaughter, exports of boxed beef increased 
impressively in the 1990s with the United States accounting for 
80 percent of beef exports. Canadian beef also made inroads fur-
ther afield with notable success in Mexican, Japanese, and South 
Korean markets. Canada's beef competed favourably on quality 
and price while the government assured consumers that Canada 
was free of BSE.7 By 2003, 20-25 percent of the Canadian cattle 
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Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Livestock Market Review (various years) and 
Statistics Canada Cansim II Series V108859, Table 20011, Apparent per capita food con-
sumption in Canada (1960-2003) 
This graph illustrates the divergence and gradual uncoupling of 
cattle slaughter from domestic beet consumption that began in the 
early 1990s. During the 1960s Canada's federally inspected cattle 
slaughter grew rapidly to meet the rising consumption ot bee! 
by Canadian consumers. Consumption peaked in 1976 and 
has since declined almost continuously, as did cattle slaughter 
until about 1990 when the relationship broke down. Divergence 
shows that the Canadian cattle and beef commodity chain has 
become uncoupled from domestic demand while live cattle and 
boxed beef exports have grown in significance. Canadian consumer 
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preferences were less relevant to an industry that became increas-
ingly reliant on exports. 
The year 2003 marks a stunning discontinuity as the series 
suddenly converge, a perverse outcome of the uncoupling or 
slaughter from consumption. Slaughter has dropped precipitously 
as Canada's cattle inventory rose to an all-time high. Consumers 
responded enthusiastically to'lower prices in a spirit of support for 
cattle producers and increased their beef consumption, high-
lighting die elasticity of its demand. 
sold in a typical week were exported live, on the hoof for 
slaughter in the United States.8 Export markets gave leverage to 
producers when they bargained with Canadian packers but left 
the producers vulnerable to U.S. trade policy on livestock. The 
worst-case scenario was realized on May 20, 2003, when a single 
case of BSE was confirmed and all of Canada's beef and cattle 
export markets slammed shut within hours. 
BOVINE TUBERCULOSIS: THE ENIGMATIC ZOONOSIS 
Long before the discovery of BSE, government regulation of 
cattle imports and the domestic meat supply was influenced by 
the prevalence of other zoonoses, animal diseases such as tuber-
culosis that can be transmitted to humans. TB was responsible for 
an estimated one-third of all deaths from disease in Victorian 
Britain.9 It had been recognized as a killer of the urban poor for 
centuries but its contagious character was not grasped until 1865, 
and the tuberculosis bacterium was not isolated and identified 
until 1892. By the time of Britain's first Royal Commission on 
Tuberculosis in 1895, it was believed that bovine TB posed a 
threat to humans. But the level of risk and the procedures that 
should be followed when tuberculosis was detected were unclear 
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and would become increasingly controversial. Could humans 
contract TB by eating beef from infected animals? What degree 
of tuberculous infection was tolerable in a beef carcass? If a valu-
able beef carcass was to be condemned in the interest of public 
health, should the butcher be compensated by the state? After 
three "science-based" Royal Commissions, there was still uncer-
tainty. We now know that raw milk, not beef, is the major vector 
of bovine TB.10 
By the 1960s, Britain's eradication program had been so 
effective that Britain's cow-herd was declared tuberculosis-free. 
However, in the mid-1990s, the incidence of bovine TB began to 
increase and spread. The cause of this resurgence is unclear but 
wild badgers are the most likely culprits. The efficacy of badger 
culling is questionable and hotly contested (Donnelly 2003). 
Science still cannot provide the certainties that farmers and con-
sumers would like. Britain's experience shows that after decades of 
claiming that bovine TB was effectively eradicated, it has reap-
peared with no consensus on the best method to control its spread. 
Canada, too, has been attempting to eradicate bovine TB 
for many decades. But sporadic cases still appear during post-
mortem inspection. Infected herds are typically quarantined and 
the cattle destroyed. While the Riding Mountain area of 
Manitoba is the only area of Canada not considered free of bovine 
TB, isolated cases are still discovered elsewhere, and in March 
2004, bovine TB was discovered near Steinbach, Manitoba, out-
e of the Riding Mountain Eradication Area. In Canada, 
cervids, such as elk and mule deer, are the most likely source of 
infection, but reservoirs of TB may be found in any warm-
blooded vertebrate community. It is especially difficult to control, 
given the spatial extent of Canada's grassland and its availability as 
cervid habitat. As in Britain, cattle producers have called for an 
aggressive cull of the elk population, and, as in Britain, the effec-
tiveness of such a cull has been challenged." The dynamics of 
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bovine TB transmission are still poorly understood,12 but there is 
considerable evidence of the growing threat to human health 
posed by multiple-drug resistant strains of the TB bacterium. 
POLICY FAILURE: THE CASE OF BSE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Given the enigmatic nature of TB after a century of research and 
concerted efforts to eradicate the disease, it is no surprise that 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is not completely 
understood either. The agent that causes BSE is a prion, a self-
reproducing proteinaceous infectious particle that did not conform 
to any of the prevailing models of microbiology when it was 
hypothesized as the cause of sheep scrapie in 1982. The prion 
was named and discovered by Dr. Stanley Prusiner who lost his 
research funding and was in danger of not being awarded tenure 
at the University of California at San Francisco. Virologists 
treated his revolutionary hypothesis with enormous skepticism 
when it was first proposed.13 Fifteen years later, Dr. Prusiner was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Medicine for discovering the prion, 
which we now know is associated with BSE. The discovery of 
the prion shows how recent scientific developments shape our 
understanding of the cause of BSE; it also underscores the con-
tentious nature of scientific progress. 
BSE was identified in November 1986 after a cow's 
abnormal behavioural symptoms were first recorded in December 
1984. Britain's Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 
(MAFF) did not know if BSE was transmissible to humans. There 
was no evidence. While absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence, the government assured the British public, repeatedly 
and authoritatively, that British beef was safe, and that BSE was 
not a danger to human health. The link between BSE and variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)14 was denied for nine years. 
Meanwhile, a natural experiment was in progress that would last 
50 
0 2 . BETTING THE FARM: FOOD SAFETY AND THE BEEF COMMODITY CHAIN 
until the incubation period (itself unknown) provided epidemiol-
ogists with sufficient data to draw a conclusion. Exponential 
growth in the number of reported cases of BSE in cattle was 
undeniable. There was a growing apprehension of a link between 
BSE and vCJD. But without a smoking gun, Britain's MAFF took 
little heed of the limited bits of evidence that were becoming 
available. Instead, the primary concern of MAFF was the nega-
tive, indeed catastrophic, impact that public knowledge of BSE 
would have on Britain's cattle and beef exports.15 
Thus the British public was taken completely by surprise in 
March 1996 when the government made a stunning volte-face. 
Ten cases of vCJD in people under the age of forty-two had been 
confirmed, and while there was still no proof that BSE could be 
transmitted to humans by eating beef, the most likely explanation 
BRITAIN'S CATASTROPHIC EXPERIENCE WITH 
BSE HAS ERODED PUBLIC TRUST IN THE 
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMMODITY CHAIN THAT 
CHANNELS THE FOOD SUPPLY TO THE SUPPER TABLE. 
was that those cases were linked to exposure to BSE before speci-
fied bovine offal products (brain, spinal cord, spleen, thymus, 
tonsils, and intestines) were banned for human consumption in 
1989. Seven days later, the European Union prohibited the 
export of all live cattle and beef products from the U.K. In an 
effort to eradicate the disease, Britain belatedly announced that 
no cattle over the age of thirty months would enter the food or 
animal feed chains.lrt 
By July 30, 2004, a total of 142 deaths had been attributed 
(definitely or probably) to vCJD in the U.K. Annual vCJD mor-
tality increased rapidly but epidemiological research suggests 
that Britain's vCJD epidemic is nearing its peak.17 Only one 
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death has been attributed to vCJD in Canada; it appears likely 
that the victim contracted the disease during multiple visits to 
the United Kingdom.18 
Britain's catastrophic experience with BSE has eroded 
public trust in the agro-industrial commodity chain that channels 
the food supply to the supper table. The challenges posed by 
BSE were not unique — similar dilemmas were raised when the 
hazards of bovine tuberculosis were first recognized in the nine-
teenth century. Yet it seems that regulators and policy makers were 
no better able to manage scientific controversy and technical 
uncertainty in the 1990s than they were in the 1890s. Science is a 
process, not a pat answer with a single objective truth. Scientists 
do not always agree and their findings can be ambiguous or even 
contradictory. In the case of BSE in Britain, scientific claims-
makers divided into in-groups — whose findings were declared 
credible and politically sound — and out-groups — who advo-
cated precaution, but without access to research material to pursue 
their unpopular views.19 Recent calls for policies, which are simply 
"science-based," do not recognize the complexity, uncertainty and 
contingency of scientific research, let alone the awesome problem 
of risk in decision-making. Experience with bovine tuberculosis 
since the nineteenth century suggests that it may be unwise for 
policy makers to prevaricate until the scientific process has finally 
yielded complete and unambiguous answers.20 
ONE IN A MILLION: CANADA'S NEWEST FOOD-BORNE ZOONOSIS 
Eleven months after the detection of BSE in May 2003, the 
Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry investigated the situation, "to explore potential solutions, 
with the aim of preventing the recurrence of such a disaster." True to its 
agricultural mandate, it emphasized the tragic consequences of 
trade disruption for farm communities, but gave no attention to 
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the challenge of risk management. The committee concluded: 
The reopening of the US border is vital to the industry's 
survival, and the Committee wants the government to 
pursue its efforts to convince the United States that it is in 
the best interests of North America as a whole to show 
leadership to the rest of the world in resuming trade based 
on scientific grounds?' 
The Senate Committee heard from "stakeholders from the entire 
beef chain," including farmers, packers and retailers, the Minister 
of Agriculture and Agri-Food, bureaucrats from Agriculture and 
Agri-Food Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA), representatives from each prairie province's association 
of rural municipalities, and the Chief Veterinary Officer for 
Canada. Of twenty-seven witnesses, only one was a veterinarian, 
and not a single microbiologist, epidemiologist, animal scientist, 
Or food scientist was identified on the witness list. Yet the Senate 
Committee advocated a resumption of trade based on scientific 
grounds'. Like Britain's discredited MAFF, which was later restruc-
tured out of existence, the primary concern of the Senate's 
Standing Committee on Agriculture was the catastrophic impact 
of BSE, not the risk-management policies that were the ultimate 
cause of the crisis. Calls for science-based policy require that 
scientists have a seat at the table. By focusing exclusively on the 
economic disruption, the Senate missed the opportunity to ask 
more fundamental questions: 
• Why did BSE appear in Canada? 
* Why did the discovery of BSE take producers and consumers 
by surprise? 
Until May 2003, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency insisted 
that Canada was "BSE-free." It was believed that bovine feed 
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ingredients from domestic animals posed "no measurable BSE 
risk to the health of Canadians."22 This policy was maintained 
even though it was well known that hundreds of cattle from 
BSE-infected countries were imported into Canada between 
1979 and 1993, one of which was confirmed to have BSE in 
1993. Based on statistical analysis, the mean expected number of 
cases of BSE among the imported cattle was three, with twenty-
four cases as the probable limit.23 What were the chances that 
one of these imported BSE-infected animals was slaughtered or 
died between 1979 and 1997 (before the feed ban), its carcass 
subsequently rendered to produce animal feed causing another 
animal to became infected with BSE? The estimated probability 
of at least one infection of BSE occurring prior to 1997 was cal-
culated to be 0.0073, about seven chances in a thousand.24 The 
CFIA concluded that the likelihood of establishment of BSE in 
cattle in Canada prior to 1997 was negligible. But two cases orig-
inating in Canada were discovered in 2003. Either Canadian 
cattle producers were extremely unlucky or the risk factors are 
still not understood. 
Professor William Leiss, one Canada's foremost experts 
in the field of risk communication, argues that the estimated 
probability assessment ignored the consequences — thus it was 
not measuring risk at all. Risk is properly calculated as the prob-
ability times the consequences. Despite the remote probability, 
the consequences would be catastrophic for the cattle industry. 
The estimation of risk should be driven by the magnitude of the 
consequences as much as by the remoteness of the probability. 
Thus Leiss argues that the risk was far from negligible — 
indeed, the risk was "intolerable."25 
Canada can no longer claim to be BSE-free. Health 
Canada's "precautionary assumption" is that "there may be a low, 
previously undetected, BSE prevalence in Canada."26 By contrast, 
the CFIA declares, "the incidence of BSE in Canada is equivalent 
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to that of a minimal risk country." Based on the Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code of the acknowledged authority, I'Office international 
des epizooties, the incidence of BSE in Canada is considered to be 
less than one in a million. Only one case of BSE has been detected 
during the last twelve-month period in a herd of approximately 
5.5 million adult cattle.27 Nevertheless, based on the recommen-
dations of the international panel that was commissioned to 
review Canada's response to the discovery of BSE, Food and 
Drug Regulations were amended to ban the sale or import of 
specified risk materials (SRM) for food in July 2003, fourteen 
years after Britain had banned the human consumption of speci-
fied bovine offal.28 
" I guess any self- respe cring rancher won][I have shot, .shovelled 
and shut up, 
Ralph Klein, Premier of Alberta, 
Western Governors' Association annual meeting 
in Big Sky, Montana, September 14, 2003 
To maintain Canada's current international standing as a 
"minimal risk" country and to stand a chance of restoring export 
markets for live cattle and beef from animals over thirty months 
old, the level of BSE testing will have to be greatly increased, 
especially among the older and higher-risk animals. Producers are 
reluctant to pay for veterinary treatment when older animals with 
little market value appear sick, and veterinarians may be unwilling 
to submit the head of euthanized livestock for testing due to the 
stigma attached to whoever triggers the next discovery of BSE in 
Canada.29 According to the Fred Dunn, Alberta's Auditor 
General, "No one wants to be that number three — that third 
case diagnosed here," which is why some farmers may elect not to 
test high risk animals for BSE and just bury their dead cows.30 
But insufficient testing of high-risk animals could itself be 
grounds for a further downgrading in Canada's BSE status by 
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I'Office international des epizooties. By July 27, 2004, it was still 
unclear how a sufficient number of samples would be gathered to 
meet Alberta's 2004 test quota.31 No one knows if a single case of 
BSE remains in Canada. Cattle producers are afraid to look for it 
but equally afraid that no one is looking for it, betting the farm 
whether they like it or not. Meanwhile consumers rely on gov-
ernment inspection to ensure that their meat is safe. 
MEAT INSPECTION 
Canada's Meat and Canned Foods Act became law in 1907, one 
year after publication of The Jungle, Upton Sinclair's sensational 
expose of unsanitary food handling practices in Chicago's meat-
packing plants.32 Canada's Meat Inspection Service was created as 
an agency of the Department of Agriculture. Any plant wishing to 
ship its products across provincial or international boundaries was 
obliged to meet federal inspection standards. 
One important lesson gleaned from Britain's BSE crisis 
was the need to separate the government department that pro-
motes and supports food commodity producers from the agency 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing food safety standards. 
Britain created an autonomous Food Standards Agency (FSA) in 
2000, with a mandate to represent the public interest, and an 
independent board, which reported to Parliament through the 
Health Ministers. In addition to the accountability change, 
Britain's FSA adopted a remarkably transparent policy on the 
proceedings of its expert committees, giving its scientists an 
unusual degree of freedom to communicate dissenting views. 
Unorthodox and contrary scientific views and minority opinions 
are considered and documented so that there is a clear audit trail 
showing how committees reached their decisions. By exposing 
scientific uncertainties and clearly identifying the very real policy 
dilemmas of what is both a scientific and a political process, the 
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FSA is attempting to avoid further policy failures of the type that 
characterized Britain's handling of BSE.33 
Wisely anticipating the structural problem revealed in the 
United Kingdom's BSE experience, Canada took pre-emptive 
action. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) was 
formed in 1997 to consolidate the delivery of all federal food, 
animal and plant health inspection programs — programs that had 
formerly been provided through four federal government depart-
ments: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada, Health Canada, and Industry Canada. While the CFIA 
still reports to parliament through the Minister of Agriculture and 
Agri-Food, it stands at arm's length from the department that pro-
motes agricultural output and international trade in food products. 
Given the importance of its mandate and the challenging 
policy questions that it is likely to face, the CFIA may require even 
greater autonomy, with a board structure that gives science more 
seats at the table, as in Britain's FSA. Such a board would include 
private sector "stakeholders" from various agri-food sectors, but it 
should also have strong representation from veterinarians, and 
food, animal, fish, and plant scientists to bring an independent sci-
entific perspective to bear on emerging food safety issues and the 
close relationships between animal and human health questions.34 
Like an auditor, the CFIA would benefit from a more independent 
structure. Government scientists should be given the freedom, 
sometimes called "whistle-blower" protection, to articulate dis-
senting views on the unprecedented food safety challenges 
emerging from industrial agriculture, innovative biotechnologies, 
a global food economy, and advances in health research. 
Protocols for Quality Assurance 
Traditional organoleptic meat inspection detects disease with the 
five senses, using techniques such as visual examination, incision, 
and palpation of various organs and lymph nodes. It is little 
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changed since these techniques were first developed in the 1880s. 
Except for the grossest abnormalities, organoleptic inspection is 
of doubtful sensitivity, and procedures such as incision have been 
known to spread pathogens.35 Considering that many recently 
identified bacterial and viral pathogens are not detectable by 
organoleptic methods, British veterinarians argue that the 
analysis and management of risk in the slaughter and carcass 
HAZARD ANALYSIS CRITICAL CONTROL POINTS 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP, pronounced 
"hassip") is widely acknowledged as the standard quality assurance 
protocol to monitor processes for safety in the food and beverage 
industries. HAACP was first developed by the Pillsbury Company 
in 1960 to attain the 100 percent quality assurance level required 
to feed astronauts in NASA's space program. 
To implement the procedure and become eligible- to claim 
HACCP compliance, it is necessary to work through a seven-
point process, beginning with hazard analysis and identification of 
the critical control points, the stages in any process where hazards 
exist. Procedures to measure, monitor, correct, and document the 
hazards and preventative actions are developed. HACCP is an 
unapologetically bureaucratic system that relies on measurement 
and documentation to integrate quality assurance into every phase 
of production. 
While HACCP can reduce risk, it is no guarantee. For 
example, K.vcel Beef (the beef producing arm of Cargill Foods in 
the United States) is HACCP accredited, but in December 2003 
it had to recall 13 tons of ground beef labelled as "irradiated for 
food safety." For nearly three months the ground beef had not, in 
fact, been irradiated at all. Even in HACCP certified plants, 
errors may persist tor prolonged periods. 
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dressing process should become the key functions of meat inspec-
tion.J6 The most common technique for risk analysis in meat 
production is Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP). 
Many of the largest meat packing firms have already developed 
sophisticated new quality assurance systems based on HACCP on 
their own initiative. HACCP certification will eventually be 
mandatory in all federally inspected meat plants, as is already the 
case in federally registered fish and seafood plants. 
The emphasis in traditional meat inspection was on ante-
mortem physical condition of livestock, and post-mortem carcass 
dressing and meat processing — but there are possibilities that 
food safety may be compromised elsewhere in the commodity 
chain, both ante-mortem and post-packaging. Ante-mortem 
inspection in the pen is usually brief and arguably less important in 
determining suitability for slaughter than an assessment of the dis-
ease and treatment history of the animal when it was on the farm.37 
The farm is the source of many animal diseases, injuries, and other 
food safety hazards such as excessive tag,38 broken hypodermic 
needles, and failure to observe specified withdrawal times after 
pharmaceutical treatment. Numerous critical control points in live-
stock production may create hazards. Feeds derived from rendered 
ruminants are now recognized as a serious hazard. This demands a 
new awareness of critical control points, both at the commercial 
feed mill, where rendered ingredients must be conscientiously seg-
regated, and in the barn, where different types of feed may be 
stored. Post-production quality assurance is no less essential, from 
loading boxed beef on the reefer truck through retail and on to the 
restaurant or household kitchen. The E. coli 0157:H7 bacterium 
originates on the farm, becomes a contaminant in the packing 
plant, multiplies if meat is improperly stored, but can be neutral-
ized in the kitchen if beef is properly cooked. 
The "farm-to-fork" concept refers to quality assurance pro-
grams that flow through the length of the commodity chain. To 
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address food safety concerns, HACCP-style quality assurance sys-
tems need to be applied at every step in the commodity chain, 
beginning with calving, extending through ante-mortem inspection 
at the slaughterhouse-door, all the way to the consumer. Farm-to-
fork quality assurance will be facilitated by the Canadian Cattle 
Identification Program, which was inaugurated in 2001. All cattle 
that move beyond their herds of origin must now have uniquely 
coded ear tags that remain in place up to the point of carcass inspec-
tion at the packing plant.39 The ability to trace animals backward to 
their herd of origin, or forward when a herd becomes dispersed, 
provides an unprecedented level of information for tracing the 
spread of animal disease and meat safety hazards from farm to fork. 
Many producers have accepted voluntary programs such as 
the Canadian Cattlemen's appropriately named "Quality Starts 
Here," which promotes best practice, but does not monitor it.40 
In Britain, the major supermarket chains sell only "Farm Assured 
British Beef and Lamb," a quality assurance certification program 
that requires producers to be inspected and subject to audits.41 
Mandatory compliance with on-farm quality assurance programs 
is the next logical step in Canada, but will be opposed by pro-
ducers who guard their independence and object to HACCP as a 
bureaucratic burden.42 Farmers will only accept quality assurance 
protocols when retailers send a clear market signal up the com-
modity chain, making certified and verified quality assurance a 
condition of market access. 
Provincial Meat Inspection and the Regulatory Paradox 
Provincially licensed slaughter plants may only sell meat within 
their home province. Cattle slaughter in provincially licensed 
plants amounted to 185,000 head in 2002 or about 6 percent of 
Canada's total reported cattle slaughter.43 Large-scale federally 
inspected meat suppliers regard the provincially inspected meat 
plants as marginal and irrelevant to Canada's large export-oriented 
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meat-packing sector. This is a fallacy with serious consequences. 
What happens in provincially inspected plants does have an 
impact on large-scale producers and their export markets. The 
"single stinking cow" that triggered the BSE crisis, according to 
Premier Klein, was sent to a provincially inspected plant and the 
animal's head languished on the laboratory shelf for over three 
months before it was finally examined and BSE was detected. 
"It was just one stinking cow, . . . " 
Ralph Klein, Premier of Alberta, 
Pacific Northwest Economic Region annual summit, 
Calgary, Alberta, July 14, 2003 
Since its inception in 1907, federal meat inspection legisla-
tion has excluded farm slaughter and the intraprovincial meat 
trade from its provisions. This had the effect of reserving the 
higher-quality cattle and hogs for export markets while the lowest-
quality cattle went to domestic consumers. Hundreds of small 
slaughterhouses served local butcher shops, seldom subject to 
any inspection. As early as 1918, the Livestock Commission of 
Saskatchewan noted the problem with selective federal standards. 
At present inspection operates only in those plants which 
do an interprovincial business, though it covers all products 
of such establishments, whether sold locally or outside. The 
consequence is that the worst stuff is reserved for local 
killing and consumption. Some districts notorious for bad 
stock are avoided by inspected plants, only to find an 
outlet locally.44 
The regulatory paradox is that when two sets of regulations are 
applied, the highest-quality goods, which are likely to meet the cri-
teria, are directed to the most demanding regulator, while the 
lower-quality goods are dispatched to the less onerous regulatory 
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regime. As standards in Canada's federally inspected plants rise, 
and plants become more comprehensively equipped to meet 
demands for food safety, the smaller provincially inspected plants 
may be left to handle the higher-risk livestock. 
Dr. Temple Grandin, the leading animal scientist in the 
field of humane livestock handling and slaughter, audited 
Canadian slaughter practices in 1995, 1999, and 2003. Noting the 
distinction between federal and provincial plants, Grandin did not 
observe any sick, debilitated or emaciated animals in federally 
inspected plants in 1995. She went on to argue that "downers" 
(livestock which cannot stand) and "cripples" have not been mirac-
ulously healed; they are simply being diverted to smaller plants, 
which are not federally inspected.45 Canada's Health of Animals 
Regulations prohibit loading or transport of downers. But every 
province has its own animal health legislation, which does not 
always provide for the humane transportation of animals. Most 
provinces have only broad guidelines, so the handling of downers 
and sick livestock varies from province to province.46 On January 
13, 2004, the CFIA banned the slaughter of downer cattle in fed-
erally inspected plants licensed for export. This interim measure 
was designed to harmonize Canada's BSE risk management meas-
ures with those in the U.S.A. in an effort to maintain market 
access.47 The effect of the CFIA ban is to divert downer cattle to 
provincially inspected plants for the domestic food chain. Thus 
provincial inspectors in small and sometimes remote plants may 
have to make a proportionally larger number of critical animal 
health decisions, but with less direct, onsite access to veterinary 
support than is the case in federally inspected plants. 
In 1995, Dr. Temple Grandin expressed reservations about 
Canada's provincially licensed plants. 
There is a need to review practices in provincial plants that 
are not federally inspected or members of the Canadian 
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Meat Council. It is likely that bad things are going on in 
some small provincial plants. I have learned from experi-
ence that very small plants come in two basic types. They 
are either excellent or disgusting.48 
Many of the provincially inspected slaughter plants that I have 
observed are cheerful family-owned businesses with conscientious 
owners and skilled workers. But few are equipped with the state-
of-the-art equipment for carcass pasteurization and sanitation of 
cutting tools found in large plants. And I have also witnessed 
ineptitude and inhumane practices in provincially inspected facili-
ties. In one case, I noted that six bullets had to be fired from a 
single-shot .22 calibre rifle before a steer was finally stunned into 
IN ONE CASE, I NOTED THAT SIX BULLETS HAD 
TO BE FIRED FROM A SINGLE-SHOT .22 CALIBRE 
RIFLE BEFORE A STEER WAS FINALLY STUNNED 
INTO INSENSIBILITY. 
insensibility. While stunning effectiveness is not a direct measure 
of meat safety, it is a determinant of meat quality. 
The 2001 Report of the Provincial Auditor of Ontario 
observed critical deficiencies in its provincially inspected meat 
plants. Hazards to human health included ineffective sanitizing 
equipment, carcasses transported in unrefrigerated trucks, and 
unsanitary food contact surfaces. Ontario's Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Rural Affairs was slow to verily that corrective action 
was taken when abattoirs were not in compliance with food safety 
regulations, meat inspectors' documentation was insufficient to 
demonstrate that operational tasks were actually being com-
pleted, and there was no procedure for random laboratory testing 
to detect evidence of contaminants in the meat produced in 
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provincial plants.49 In August 2003, a provincially inspected plant 
in Aylmer, Ontario was investigated for the alleged sale of unin-
spected meat, slaughtering without a provincial inspector present, 
and processing of dead stock. No charges were actually laid, but 
the allegations were widely reported. Between 1991 and 2003 the 
firm's licence was provisionally suspended five times and on two 
other occasions the firm was warned about illegal slaughter and 
obstructing a meat inspector.50 
These events prompted a judicial inquiry into meat regula-
tion and inspection in Ontario. Among other problems in the 
provincial inspection system, Justice Roland Haines found evidence 
of nepotism in the appointment of meat inspectors, and pointed 
to deficiencies in their qualifications and training after provincial 
government cutbacks had replaced permanent inspectors with part-
time contractual appointees.51 He also identified conflict of interest 
as an issue. Unlike the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, which 
operates at some remove from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 
provincial meat inspection is typically a function within provincial 
ministries of agriculture.52 Thus provincial inspection authorities 
may feel torn between their responsibilities to consumers and their 
active support of livestock producers. In Ontario, Justice Haines 
found evidence of, "a reluctance to act decisively when the issues 
of public safety and client welfare collide. This only fuels the per-
ception that public safety is sometimes taking a backseat to the 
agricultural business."53 
Provinces such as Ontario claim that provincial inspection 
standards are equivalent to federal food standards, and that the dif-
ference between federal and provincial inspection is primarily one 
of scale and scope, not food safety outcomes.54 Notwithstanding 
their equivalent inspection standards, provincially inspected plants 
are typically not as well equipped with state-of-the-art sanitation 
equipment, and are not as well designed and constructed to pre-
vent contamination. The qualifications, training, and experience of 
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provincial inspectors varies from one province to another, as does 
the frequency and intensity of support by professional veterinar-
ians. At the retail meat case and in commercial or institutional 
dining rooms, it is often unclear whether meat was provincially or 
federally inspected, and it is difficult to discover where it was 
slaughtered and processed. 
Many Canadians prefer to buy meat from locally produced 
livestock, and there is growing interest in organic and natural 
meat products, community-supported agriculture, and alterna-
tive farming practices. This trend should reinforce the role of 
small-scale, locally oriented slaughter plants in the commodity 
chain. The friendly, small-town butcher, operating a small provin-
cially inspected plant, provides a valued alternative to national 
chain stores and large scale meat-packing plants. But the friendly 
butcher may also be processing older livestock that are more likely 
to be disabled or to have some zoonotic infection. Experience with 
locally oriented kill plants suggests that small is not always beau-
tiful, and provincially licensed slaughter plants may need more 
intensive quality assurance than is presently the case. 
The smaller abattoir environment poses unique challenges 
to meat inspection, given the prevalence of part-time kill floors 
that operate only one day per week, staff who are only intermit-
tently employed in slaughter and carcass dressing tasks, and 
part-time meat inspectors. Some provincially inspected abattoirs 
are in peripheral regions, making it difficult to provide imme-
diate support from professional veterinarians. Given the growing 
importance attached to food safety, the rapid developments in 
the biotechnology of meat inspection, and the important role 
played by smaller meat plants, would Canadians be better served 
by one rationalized system of meat inspection instead of eleven? 
Can we still justify two classes of inspection, one of which is not 
eligible for export and not acceptable for most fast-food and 
supermarket chains, yet satisfactory for domestic consumers? 
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Can more effective methods of meat hygiene and risk manage-
ment be developed specifically for the needs of small plants? 
BETTING THE FARM IN RISK SOCIETY 
Sociologist Anthony Giddens, Director of the London School of 
Economics, has identified the politics of risk as one of the most 
distinctive aspects of modern society. Risk is an evaluation of a 
hazard — often quantified as a probability — that may materialize 
in the future. A concern with uncertain future events, justifying 
institutions such as fire departments, is among the hallmarks of 
modernity. Why has risk become so important? Modern society 
MODERN SOCIETY HAS A CAPACITY 
TO CREATE "MANUFACTURED RISKS" 
ON AN UNPRECEDENTED SCALE. 
has a capacity to create "manufactured risks" on an unprecedented 
scale. Unlike the chances of being hit by lightning (a natural 
hazard with an improbable but quantifiable risk), we have no 
idea of the likelihood of our manufactured hazards. Cassandras 
warn of sea level rise or bacterial resistance to antibiotics as cata-
strophic outcomes of anthropogenic global change. What is the 
risk that one of these post-modern plagues may be visited upon 
future generations? Civil society does not know, and scientists do 
not agree. Thus Giddens says that there is a new "riskiness to 
risk" creating "a new moral climate of politics" in our "risk 
society."55 Politicians are charged with a cover-up if they elect 
not to take action and the worst-case scenario materializes. And 
if they take action against a non-existent menace, they are 
charged with scare-mongering. Science-based policy-making 
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can't always win — that is the fundamental problem posed by 
risk society. 
One way to resolve this problem is to apply the "precau-
tionary principle," a risk management tool which states that a lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for post-
poning decisions.56 The precautionary principle is written into 
the Treaty of Maastricht, and adopted by all member countries 
of the European Union. To avoid the risks posed by growth hor-
mones, the EU applied the precautionary principle in its continuing 
ban on Canadian and American beef imports.57 Among most 
Canadian cattle producers, this use of the precautionary principle 
is perceived as a hypocritical pretext for a protectionist trade 
policy that discriminates against Canadian beef. These trans-
Atlantic differences illustrate polar opposites in the moral climate 
of politics described by Giddens. 
The precautionary principle has also been adopted by the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency and by the Canadian govern-
ment at large.58 Yet applying the principle to decision-making is 
challenging because there is no consensus in the public's percep-
tion and tolerance of risk. Instead there is a broad plurality of risk 
preferences. Risk preference plurality poses a conundrum for 
policy-makers trying to discern whether "risk of serious harm" is 
truly credible. William Leiss argues that the risk of BSE was clear: 
Trouble has been brewing for Canada's beef industry for 
many years, during which both political and industry 
leaders followed the well-known three monkeys' routine 
("hear no evil . . ."). The bottom line is, Canada — with a 
$30 billion annual beef industry to protect — has been 
appallingly lax in its policies designed to minimize BSE 
risk. In more technical language, we have been insuffi-
ciently precautionary, by a wide margin, in response to the 
economic risk represented by BSE.59 
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In the area of BSE policy, Canadians behaved as daring risk-
takers. Canadians bet the farm, counting on denial and long odds 
to escape calamity. Canada came up short, and all Canadians are 
paying the price. If Canadians are fundamentally risk-averse, 
given that the stakes are so high, then we need to recognize that 
we are living in risk society and start applying the precautionary 
principle more consistently from farm to fork. 
Glib assertions that policy decisions should be "science-
based" ignore the essentially political character of risk assessment. 
Science and politics must interact, so that the ambiguities of sci-
entific findings and the subtleties of scientific judgment may be 
communicated and shared with consumers in the climate of 
uncertainty that characterizes our risk society. 
In coping with challenges at every stage in the commodity 
chain, cattle producers, beef packers, and government regulators 
have already demonstrated enormous ingenuity, showing evi-
dence of innovation at every step. This chapter points to some 
areas where further innovation seems warranted and likely in the 
near term. None of these proposals is truly novel, and initiatives 
are already underway to address each of them; however, progress 
has been glacial. 
• Give the CFIA and provincial meat inspection agencies greater 
autonomy both in their relationship to agricultural interests and 
internally, perhaps with a board structure that brings scientific 
perspectives to bear on "science-based" regulatory questions. 
• Examine provincial meat inspection from a nation-wide per-
spective and consider some nation-wide benchmarks. Consider 
creative ways to implement higher national standards yet 
retain the essential character of small-scale meat plants. 
• Extend quality assurance programs from "farm to fork." 
• Use the precautionary principle, and assess risk as the product 
of probability and consequences to avoid future zoonotic 
catastrophes. 
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While food safety issues are changing rapidly, the challenges 
and ambiguities of decision-making under uncertainty will 
always be with us. To manage food safety risks wisely, in a 
dynamic policy environment, we must involve scientists more 
^directly in decision-making processes. And we must avoid sim-
plistic calls for science-based policy when there is disagreement, 
using appeals to science to validate the status quo. As Canada 
Beamed to its cost, we could be betting the farm: the odds may 
seem good but the consequences could be catastrophic. 
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